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HALF A LOAF OR NO BREAD: A POLITICAL LIFE OF P 0 VUNDLA [l] 
David Goodhew 
Philip Qipu Vundla was prominent as a political leader on the Rand from the early 1940s 
until his death in 1972. He was based in the Western Areas of Johannesburg until the area 
was declared a "black spot" and the inhabitants removed, and thereafter in Soweto. To a 
remarkable degree he married concern for local issues to national politics. Thus he remained 
as an Advisory Board member at Western Native Township (WNT) from 1942 to 1962 
whilst being involved in campaigns of the Communist Party, various trade unions and the 
ANC, becoming a member of the national executive of the latter from 1952 to 1955. During 
campaigning against Bantu Education he was felt to have opposed the ANC's policy and was 
expelled from the organisation. Thereafter Vundla was only active in local politics. 
This paper will attempt firstly to discuss the link between class and the radical leaders of the 
district, of whom Vundla was one of the most significant. Secondly it will attempt to shed 
light on a key political leader of the 1940s and 1950s [2] and relate him to the politics of the 
Western Areas during these turbulent years. 
Several influential studies of political leadership in black South African politics have pointed 
to the way in which class guides the actions of such leaders to a c~nsiderable xtent. Leaders 
are shown to have come mostly from the small group who were traders, artisans, teachers and 
clerks. Whether characterised as petty bourgeois or lower middle class, they endorsed 
common cultural values: notably education ,Christianity and "law and order". Their position 
between labour and capital was reflected in political attitudes which "identified upwards" or 
"identified downwards". [3] This approach illuminates much but leaves fkther questions 
unanswered. Why did leaders so often come from such a narrow stratum? What common 
cultural ties were there between leaders and led? When leaders identified downwards, were 
they drawn down by the whole community or by fragments of it, and if so which and why? 
An examination of the backgrounds of a number of consistently ribclical leaders in the 
Western Areas may shed light on these questions. [4] 
Helen Bradford points out that leaders necessarily tended to come from a more educated 
stratum than the bulk of the black population since their role required possession of literacy 
and administrative skills. [5] But there were other forces shaping the backgrounds of 
political figures. S P Bunting wrote in the early 1920s of how 
Any native found effectively organising his fellow workers and 
refusing to be bought or flattered out of his duty to them can be 
and is readily deprived of all chance of making a livelihood apart 
from what other trouble lies in store for him, and requires to be 
provided with independent means of subsistence, however 
inconsiderable, to carry on his work. [6] 
Similar pressures continued to be felt by more radical leaders into the 1950s. [7] Of leading 
figures in the Western Areas, Vundla, Marks, Radebe and Resha could testify to the close 
correlation between radical politics and the sack. [g] Apart from dismissal, assault and even 
attempted assassination might be the lot of such leaders - as Vundla's experience indicates. 
Such instability - coupled with the time which political activities took up - constituted a 
major barrier between continued radicalism and the paid employment usually taken by 
residents of the Western Areas. 
Trade was one alternative [g], and another avenue was estate agency - favoured by Marks, 
Radebe, Bopape and Sisulu. [l01 A number, such as Vundla, Resha or Marks, lived for 
much of the time as full-time leaders, sometimes coupled with journalism, though this could 
place great financial strains on their families. [l l] Advisory Board members received a 
small allowance and could expect to be rewarded for efforts made for individual residents. 
Some board members seem to have been able to live by such means alone. [l21 
Many political meetings of these years ended with some form of collection and there were 
occasional mutterings that not all the proceeds went on the cause for which they were 
raised. [l31 The question of to what extent some leaders were championing causes to raise 
funds - rather than vice versa as political "entrepreneurs" - is an important one, though 
beyond the scope of this paper. What is clear is that political inclination affected occupation 
just as occupation affected political inclination. 
I would argue that strands of culture such as belief in education, religion and "law and order" 
were not only the preserve of a middle class but formed key constituents of popular culture, 
though they tended to be embraced by the more settled, older sections of the population. [l41 
Endorsement of such values was as common amongst the most radical leaders as the more 
conservative. The Civic Guard movement, intended to combat appalling levels of crime 
committed mostly by unemployed young people, was supported by politicians of all shades 
of opinion. [l51 Rsbert Resha, whom the state in the Treason Trial singled out as 
particularly extreme because of his equivocation over the question of violence, was a 
member of the Johannesburg Joint Council (an extremely moderate body) a few years earlier. 
Vundla could stand for temperance. Josie Mpama (Palmer), a leading woman activist in the 
Communist Party, called for beer-halls for single migrants but home brewing for the 
"respectable native" who otherwise "has to drink with a type of person with whom he does 
not associate. [l61 Emphases on law and order, temperance and on the distinction between 
the mores of migrants and township residents were compatible with the most radical politics 
of the day. Likewise, in the mid-1950s no contradiction was felt to exist in such leaders 
wholeheartedly endorsing campaigns to preserve freehold rights and access to an even 
remotely decent education. Adherence to the ethos of settled, older residents was compatible 
with, and could even be conducive to, a radical stance. This was the background to Vundla's 
political career. 
P Q Vundla was born in Healdtown in the Ciskei where he received some education but 
failed in his efforts to obtain secondary schooling.' Then followed a succession of jobs, first 
in East London and then in Johannesburg before he landed "a good post" as a mine clerk. 
Such security was not to last. Although having no previous political background Vundla 
gave evidence to the Lansdowne Commission regarding poor conditions on the mines, was 
demoted and chose to resign rather than accept the humiliation. Instead, he became an 
organiser for the newly formed African Mineworkers' Union (AMWU), having recently been 
elected on to the Advisory Board of WNT. [l71 
By the early 1940s, when Vundla rose to political prominence, the various townships 
comprising the Western Areas were well established and had distinctive characteristics. 
Sophiatown and Newclare were freehold townships but were otherwise very different. 
Sophiatown, the larger of the two, had many more African owners than Newclare and 
contained a much larger number of schools and churches. Newclare contained within it 
several distinct communities: a coloured community which hermetically sealed itself off 
form the rest of the township; a substantial Indian community, with property and trading 
interests; a large section of the southern end of the township occupied mainly by Sotho 
women brewing beer for migrant workers in the surrounding mines. 
Unconstrained by Council control, the population in the freehold townships rose well above 
that of WNT, a location. By 195 1 they held some 60,000 people whilst WNT had a further 
20,000. [l81 Demography combined with the constraints of municipal administration to give 
WNT a distinctive character. With a small, more settled population, WNT had a higher 
proportion of domestic servants, washerwomen, professional and clerical workers and a 
lower proportion of labourers and single migrants than the other townships. [l91 Since 
township rents were not increased in line with inflation, it became markedly cheaper to live 
in WNT, and tenants tended to stay put, whereas in Sophiatown and Newclare high rents 
encouraged frequent moves and even flight. WNT was also much better provided for with 
school places than Sophiatown or, especially, Newclare. [20] The township's more stable 
nature was reflected in marriage patterns. Half the marriages in the freehold townships were 
by traditional custom and a sixth by Christian rites, but in WNT this proportion was 
reversed. [2 l] 
The political climate in the townships prior to 1939 had been rather subdued. The ANC, ICU 
and the Communist Party were present in the area, but only the latter engaged in intensive 
and persistent campaigning, drawing forth little response. This is not to suggest residents 
were happy with their conditions. In WNT constant protests were made about rent (which 
was eventually reduced) and in the freehold townships African owners successfully 
prevented the Council from restricting their right to take in tenants. But in neither case were 
such causes taken up by the national bodies. 
Activism finally bore fruit in 1939 with a successful beer-hall boycott, but the 1940s saw a 
return to the comparative quiescence of the previous years. The Communist Party remained 
the most prominent national body present in the district but it was in decline by the end of the 
decade. [22] Vundla, though active as an Advisory Board member and with strong links with 
the Communists, directed his energies mostly towards national campaigning. He was 
engaged in campaigns such as those against passes, for teachers' salaries and the People's 
Assembly for Votes for All in 1948. [23] But he was most heavily involved in trade union 
activity, being an organiser for the AMWU and the Council of Non-European Trade Unions 
(CNETU). [24] 
The political tempo only quickened in 1949, with a remarkably well supported tram boycott. 
This was followed by two well supported stay-aways in 1950, the organisation of Civic 
Guard across the area in 1951-52, and the Defiance Campaign of 1952. In these years South 
Africa as a whole was markedly radicalized, and nowhere more so than the Western Areas. 
However, the campaigns also exposed major fissures within the district over the question of 
violent or non-violent tactics and the tension between more settled residents and youths and 
the Sotho "Russians" gang over crime. 
Although those who boycotted the trams or stayed away from work were mostly older 
residents, the tram boycott and stay-aways of 1949-50 were punctuated by virtual pitched 
battles between young people and police. Such conflict also led to attacks on Indian and 
Chinese owned shops in the area. [25] Leaders, whilst recognizing the conditions 
encouraging conflict, persistently distanced themselves from the violence and emphasised the 
need for an inter-racial approach. [26] The tram boycott and stay-aways had been 
remarkable expressions of solidarity but with solidarity had come massive repression and 
inter-racial conflict within the Western Areas. Furthermore, the area's volatile nature 
provided the government with a substantial rod with which to beat political leaders, most 
, 
notably in the commission appointed to enquire into the tram boycott riots and the troubles in 
Newclare (as well as other areas). Vundla himself had been detained and assaulted during 
the tram boycott and was the object of an anti-communist witch-hunt early in 1950. [27] 
Because of such pressure, Vundla played little part in the protests of 1950. [28] After 1950, 
open-ended appeals for boycotts or stay-aways ceased to be the norm, whilst the Defiance 
Campaign, the Civil Guard movement and the Removal Campaign were characterized by 
much greater regimentation. The momentum of the tram boycott was to be sustained but not 
by violent protest. 
Continuing appalling levels of crime, mostly carried out by unemployed youth, led to the 
revival of the earlier Civic Guard movement in 1951-52. This drew support from right across 
the political spectrum and had considerable success in making the area safer. But it was 
particularly endorsed by older, more settled residents and, apart from inevitable antagonism 
between it and the youth, it also came into conflict with the Sotho "Russians" gang and the 
Sotho enclave in Newclare South. The results were bloody in the extreme and coincided with 
the advent of the Defiance Campaign. By dividing the district and diverting the energies of 
leaders, it did little to aid the campaign's progress in the area. [29] 
The local leadership of such events included several people who had been heavily involved 
in or connected with the Communist Party until its banning, such as Marks, Vundla and 
Kenosi. Until 1950 the ANC had been largely inactive in the area [30], and a number of such 
figures became leading lights in the organization thereafter. However, it would be a mistake 
to see the Communist Party, banned in 1950, as simply feeding into the ANC. The party was 
itself at a low ebb in the area in the late 1940s. There was already a considerable overlap 
between the two bodies, whilst Vundla seems to have worked closely with the Communist 
Party without being a member and his statements do not suggest that he was deeply 
influenced by the party's thinking. [3 l] It is important to emphasize the centrality of WNT 
and its Advisory Board in the boycott and the Civic Guard. Though the most stable and 
respectable of the three townships, it had a direct channel for communicating with residents 
and with the Council. Only registered tenants (some 20 per cent of adults) could vote and 
only a minority of them did. Yet the Advisory Board was the body with the greatest 
legitimacy amongst the population. [32] 
In the early 1950s the ANC emerged as the main force in black politics in the Western Areas 
and across the country, and Vundla's prominence increased at the same time. Through the 
tram boycott and the Civic Guard he had become the most significant figure in the district 
and, after ten years of activism, he emerged on to the national stage as a member of the 
ANC's national executive and vice-president of CNETU. 1331 During the Defiance 
Campaign Vundla took charge of publicity and provision for the families of those arrested 
whilst "defying". [34] 
The removal, as part of the implementation of apartheid, of the Western Areas (and of 
Sophiatown in particular) did much to ensure the area's fame and, as the episodes concerning 
the enforcing of the removals have been well covered elsewhere, only material relevant to 
Vundla will be discussed. [35] Meetings were held in 1953 but it was only in the following 
year that the campaign against removal got into gear. By now Vundla was chair of the 
Western Areas branch of the ANC and one of the most important figures in the campaign, 
despite his not being affected by removal of freehold rights, which formed the centre of the 
protest. 
Vundla and other leaders sought to harness the youth to the campaign against removal but 
without the violent consequences of the 1949-50 campaigns. Passive resistance was the 
watchword, direct confrontation was to be avoided. [36] But this entailed disillusioning 
many younger residents, all the more so when the tactics against removal proved woefully 
ineffective in the face of the massive force deployed. [37] The removal campaign, despite 
the constant pressure of the police, constituted the pinnacle of Vundla's political career and 
his popularity was reflected in his hold on W T .  The opposition of previous years 
evaporated and in the election of December 1954 Vundla's grouping on the Advisory Board 
won easily. This was undoubtedly helped by a successful campaign to block rent 
increases. [38] Residents' meetings were now effectively ANC meetings. 
Immediately following the campaign against removal came the campaign against Bantu 
Education, in which Vundla was also heavily involved. The nature and timing of the national 
campaign were highly confused [39] and this was reflected in the Western Areas. 
Sophiatown showed eagerness to call an indefinite boycott but a residents' meeting in WNT, 
where parents were more heavily represented, was less keen. [40] Amid general uncertainty, 
the boycott broke out in a piecemeal fashion, starting on the East Rand. As other districts, 
including the Western Areas, followed suit, Vundla sought to compromise and called for a 
boycott but not an indefinite one. [41] 
The government's response was rapid and harsh: all children who did not return to school by 
April 25 were to be permanently excluded. Vundla, who in the Civic Guard had fought hard 
against tsotsidom, now foresaw an entire generation of delinquents and called on residents to 
send their children back to. school. At a subsequent meeting in WNT he was attacked by a 
group of youths, stabbed twice in the head and nearly killed. There is strong evidence to 
suggest that Sophiatown Youth League members were responsible, though they seem to have 
used local gang members for the attack. 1421 At the same time the government further 
embittered the boycotters by carrying out its threat: dismissing 60 teachers and 3000 pupils 
from the area as well as many more outside it 
Two of the Advisory Board members opposed Vundla's stance but residents' meetings were 
solidly behind him. Vundla clashed with an alliance between radical Congressites (Moretsele 
and Matseke) and a conservative nominated member (Phohlele) over his desire to use the 
communal hall to house a temporary school for those who had been expelled. [43] The ANC l 
national executive seemed to point in both directions, censuring the radicalism of the 
Transvaal ANC for starting the boycott early but condemning Vundla's caution and 
removing him from his post as the head of the Western Areas ANC branch. [44] l 
The damage done to unity in the district was evident in preparations in May for the Congress ? I 
of the People. Whilst there was much activity in Sophiatown, a residents' meeting in WNT 
showed little interest. This split was made formal in mid-July when Vundla was expelled 
from the ANC. [45] Perhaps the strongest ANC area in the country was now deeply divided 
and Vundla, who had earlier to defend his stance from the charge of extremism 1461, was 
now reviled by many as a sell-out. 
Yet he retained the continuing support of many residents of WNT for his stance on the 
boycott. Moreover, Lovedale Mfeka, Vundla's "lieutenant" on the Advisory Board, and Ida 
Mntwana, leader of the Transvaal ANC Women's Section and prominent congressite in the 
township, denounced the expulsion. 1471 Vundla and Mntwana attempted to heal the breach; 
using a mixture of calls for reconciliation, threats and demonstrations. No settlement 
occurred [48], and the Advisory Board elections of that year saw Vundla and Mfeka trounce 
their former partners, Moretsele and Matseke. [49] Vundla was back to where he had started 
in 1942, an Advisory Board member, albeit a well-supported one. 
Without substantially greater holdings of private political papers, it is difficult to do more 
than speculate as to why Vundla's fall was so abrupt. Until his call for a return to school he 
had been at the apex of ANC leadership and head of its most active branch. It is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that his expulsion was not solely because of disagreements over the 
boycott. The speed of his decline suggests that his ebullient, idiosyncratic style had won him 
few fiiends amongst his fellow leaders. More generally, the campaigns against removals and 
Bantu Education had been badly planned and executed. Because he had rescinded the call for 
the boycott Vundla was an obvious target for blame. 
At the same time a new element entered Vundla's make-up, which greatly shaped his 
political attitudes. Shortly after being assaulted he was approached by and joined the Moral 
Re-armament Movement (MRA). This was a non-denominational Christian body which grew 
up in the post-war period, calling for reconciliation between the Allied and Axis powers and 
between the protagonists of the Cold War. In South Africa it espoused a mixture of anti- 
communism and faith in interracial reconciliation. [50] It drew support from leaders who 
were or had become notable conservatives, such as Selope Thema or Drs Nhlapo and 
Nkomo, and had strong links with the Bantu World; which took a line highly critical of l 
radical politics. [51] To suggest that the organisation was "an international conspiracy" may 
have been exaggerated, but MRA's apolitical stance was certainly dubious. [52] 
In that it offered Vundla an alternative organisational base and later led to tangible benefits, 
including trips abroad and eventually a house built for him in Dube after WNT's removal, he 
had prosaic reasons for joining this group. Some of those who knew him felt that conversion 
was in essence a ploy [53], but the tangible benefits came only after some while, suggesting 
that they were not his main motivation for getting involved. Given the extreme hostility 
shown to him it is not altogether surprising that he should react in a similarly dramatic 
manner. Aspects of his change of heart suggest genuine conviction. At a time of gross 
government insensitivity Vundla seems to have been genuinely impressed that there were 
still those who could treat him "like a fellow countryman and colleague". [54] Converts 
often emphasize the sins of their earlier years, but Vundla's repudiation of his autocratic style 
of leadership rings true. [55] His behaviour towards his family was similar and his wife saw 
his conversion as a definite break with the past and a decided improvement. [56] 
This did not mean a break from involvement in local issues, and early in 1956 he was caught 
up in attempts to end gang wars in Sophiatown and WNT. He could still be spoken of 
approvingly by the radical press and supported a campaign against rent increases. [58] 
However, exasperated by his failure to be reconciled with national politics, Mntwana and 
Mfeka, his staunchest supporters, turned against him and came close to unseating him from 
the Advisory Board. [59] 
More important in confirming his complete break with radical politics was his stance on the 
bus boycott early in 1957. Vundla was away doing work for MRA when it started, and took a 
stance of careful ambiguity, unable to join a boycott led by his opponents in the Advisory 
Board elections but unwilling to toe the City Council's line. Vundla supported a compromise 
group and the situation polarized, with Sophiatown Youth Leaguers again the most militant - 
storming a meeting chaired by Vundla and attempting to set his house on fire. [61] Vundla's 
stance on the bus boycott left him far more isolated than over the question of Bantu 
Education. He had been seen to equivocate over one of the most significant popular protests 
of the decade. 
WNT's removal began in 1961 and these years were for both the township and for Vundla a 
curious twilight phase. He continued to represent residents' grievances and continued to be 
re-elected at the top of the poll - registered tenants (the only voters) being drawn from the 
older section of the township, who stayed solidly behind Vundla. Yet he was frequently 
absent on MRA business and from 1960 moved to a house in Dube. The Council bent its own 
rules to allow him to sit on WNT's Advisory Board without actually living in the township in 
return for Vundla's cooperation in WNT's removd - a cosy relationship, made all the more 
striking by earlier struggles. [62] 
Thus ended an extraordinary political career in the Western Areas of Johannesburg, though 
Vundla was to remain active in Sowetan affairs until his death in 1972. In the 1940s he 
worked on a diverse group of issues with various organisations. Between 1949 and 1955 he 
became a key local and national leader in a series of very popular campaigns under the ANC. 
Had he not been expelled from congress, he would almost certainly have been one of the 
Treason Trialists. After his controversial expulsion, his decision to remain active in local 
politics meant adopting positions at variance with his past. Having lost a political empire he 
was unable to find a role. 
Vundla is also suggestive of some of the problems of using terms such as petty bourgeoisie 
or lower middle class with regard to political leaders. It obscures the way in which radical 
political leadership sharply restricted options in terms of occupation. With regard to culture, 
this may conceal the extent to which "petty bourgeois" values (e.g. interest in education, 
Christianity, "law and order") resonated widely amongst a township population. Emphasising 
a class cleavage between leaders and led may also obscure deep divisions within the latter. 
Leaders such as Vundla faced major contradictions: between young and old; Civic Guards 
and "Russians"; WNT and Sophiatown; a non-racial or an Africanist approach; local and 
national politics; violence or non-violence. On the question of the Bantu Education Boycott 
Vundla was torn not only in his own mind but between two constituencies. That delicate 
equation of half a loaf or no bread was never an easy one to answer. 
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